Early Modern Comparative Essay

Dissertation 03.11.2019

These and other finds showed that the Neanderthals had populated Europe comparative from modernto 28, years ago early which they became extinct. The generation that followed them paid more attention to two foundational themes of early American history much closer to home: the role of colonial assemblies and the uneven essay of slavery as a major labour regime.

While these misunderstandings have the potential to raise new questions especially in comparative and connected histories of empire, they also blur definitions in national historiographies. The long, painful war was composed of a series of battles that were primarily fought on German soil with several nations taking part. The impression, voiced very succinctly by Stephan Wendehorst and others, that definitions of empire have lost their edge is, thus, an indication of something positive and challenging: the increasing connections between a set of scholarly endeavours formerly confined to one academic tradition, language, or region. Opera is one of the types of music in the Baroque era. Introduction Empires manage difference. ISBN hardcover , pages. And yet, with many of their day-to-day practices they also did empire.

Baroque era was usually referred to as the thorough-bass period. It intersected with vibrant national movements in Central and Eastern Europe that helped unpick and reform empire.

I will go through these categories one by one contrasting them with early modern case material. This tradition of envisioning empire reaches back, for instance, to claims to what British and French considered North American hinterlands. Territorialised ideas of early modern polities, in fact, sit oddly with many theorists of empire in the world and Europe. More often, they thought of empire in terms of rights in labour, privileges, and people. To be sure, political thinkers formulated legal claims to land that Europeans considered unused and ritualistically took possession of that land. Even if they settled overseas, these settlements remained confined to small, if exploitative pockets until well into the eighteenth century. Groups that were systematically marginalised in the many smaller and larger polities they constituted found access to imperial institutions or the emperor very attractive. Recently, Wendehorst has coined the term Guiccardini-paradigm, after the Renaissance historian who first systematically discussed it, for this phenomenon. The ruler could take on a central role in embodying that authority, while those inhabiting empire imagined themselves as subjects. Let us consider some examples from the Holy Roman Empire to explore that aspect further. Depending on the circumstances these courts offered subjects chances to circumvent and challenge intermediary princely powers. In the Holy Roman Empire, the Emperor, for instance, had agents at local princely courts to negotiate diplomatic relations, a subject Thomas Lau has recently studied. The disproportionately large number of seats that Scotland won in British Parliament in , for instance, stands out — especially if we consider how North American colonists failed to achieve a comparable representation in London. Subjects in the Danish empire shared one faith from the imperial fiefdoms Schleswig and Holstein over Denmark and Norway to Iceland and the Faroe islands. Regime change could also introduce a ruler with a different confessional outlook as was the case in struggles between Protestant Riga and the Polish-Lithuanian king Sigismund II August. Connections between religion and empire, thus, empowered subjects, but they also bolstered an early modern sense of imperial mission and historical purpose 8 that was later often interlaced with concepts of civilisation, progress, and race. Let us investigate one caesura around , traditionally associated with imperial crisis. Maya Jasanoff, for instance, uncovers the fates of roughly 60, who sided with Britain and were displaced during the American Revolutionary War. This entailed demands for imperial reform which closely resembled the demands of American revolutionaries themselves. He explained how magnates in the Ottoman, Safavid and Mughal empires came to rival their imperial overlords. This is for three main reasons: First, it does not disallow anyone from integrating a pluralised notion of modernity as Partha Chatterjee and others have proposed. And, third, it helps frame why those who spoke of empire in the nineteenth century could still invoke family, friends, and kings before speaking of industry, telegraph, or steamship. Much of the debate about definitions also amounts to conflicts between inductive and deductive approaches. But even inductive approaches need to justify why they consider a certain set of practices as imperial. The group of German-speaking historians discussed above who study early modern empires that are usually neglected by imperial history have proposed to focus on techniques, personnel, and institutions within a set definition. It seems crucially important that even inductive approaches that treat empire — like I will in the next part — as a set of practices relate them to a common denominator. This merely replaces one problem with another as the rich literature on statecraft has already shown. As the Roman term imperium suggests, empire was meant to enable people to do something. To be sure, coercion played a central role and violence occurred in early modern power relations, but in most cases it was not the desirable outcome. In addition to downright force, power relations, of course, crucially hinged on language and mutual perception. These mutual perceptions transformed power into Herrschaft. And they help historians shift the focus from structure to process: from empires as state-like entities to empire as a practice that could help some to create and help others to unpick existing institutions. Depending on the empire under consideration, successive historiographical waves have presented a string of contenders. The basic parameters governing how empires could take shape — from above, from below, from between empires or from in-between and across empires and other polities — reflect the historiographical trends outlined in the first part of this essay. Some suggested that metropolitan politicians, merchants, missionaries, and soldiers made empire. In the background, rivalries between empires also continued to exert a crucial influence. These competing claims that rivalling groups haphazardly made empire from above and others instantly unmade it from below also inspired an increasing focus on intermediaries who moved in-between alleged centres and peripheries and between empires. But while this inversion of power dynamics sits well with a historiography sceptical of top-down histories of states and empires, it also upsets the very subject under consideration. If means of coercion were so limited, those who practiced empire either had to share some ideological common ground with distant rulers, or they had to fear coercion enough to comply regardless. To soften the dichotomy, local agents needed to manufacture obedience with their allies. This manufacturing process involved many hands whose personal obligations ranged from friendship, marriage, kinship, fiefdom, vassalage, and servitude to bonds of money and ideology. To the contrary, protecting the British Isles and interrupting trade patterns dominated naval strategising. Scholars have reinvestigated, for instance, the role of the Navy as a forum for critique in the period leading up to the British Civil War and identified the Navy as a source of discontent in the American crisis. In fact, thinking in terms of families and personal obligation permeated other areas as well. Historians of early modern Spain and its empire have already gone far in advancing this notion. The remainder of this section looks at some of these practices of empire in more detail. Empires used political voids, hijacked existing institutions, and often recruited personnel of the realms they incorporated. Imperial stability, thus, crucially depended on a degree of flexibility that an instructive comparison of Qing China and Imperial Rome delineates. When and how depended on the social clout of those who uttered these words. In , Antony G. Power lies not just in conquest, but in claiming the authority to forge the story of empire and define what preceded it [] : Imperial narratives even inverted the relationality of colonial violence, turning the colonised into perpetrators. Chatterjee, for instance, shows how Thomas Babbington Macaulay utilised a version of an almost forgotten event in Mughal India, the death of a group of imprisoned British soldiers in Calcutta, to present the British as a civilising force in a disorderly and despotic India. Many of these stories were so strikingly similar in different regions not just because they were remade by Western historiography, but because empires responded to the comparable challenge of maintaining loyalty among vast networks of interdependent followers. Religious agents occupied a major role as critics and promoters of empire. Quite often they played both roles at the same time. Religion was neither on the way out during the early modern period, nor should it be put in too stark a contrast with Enlightened arguments to legitimise empire. Imperial religious fervour no longer pertains to Catholics or a small group of radical Protestants in New England either. British historians have argued that the first post-Reformation empire was born out of militant Protestantism, and grappled from the start with its inbuilt heterodoxy. It helped agents to reshape empires. Successions drew imperial networks in sharp relief as they were often accompanied by purges or struggles over rights to particular subjects, territories or privileges. Furthermore, taking dynastic thought seriously sets Europe apart from other dynastic systems: Agnatic primogeniture, monogamous marriage, and Salic law framed political conflict. At the same time the focus on the rule of the first-born son from a legitimate marriage also created dynastic crises well into the eighteenth century. Faruqui convincingly shows how the critique of a prince pierced through layers of courtly etiquette that otherwise prevented a discussion of policies. What past historians have, thus, often considered a failure to create modern institutions served an important political function in harnessing elite rivalry and preventing critique from damaging the emperor. Subjects in empires also made sophisticated legal claims that did not merely pit an imposed legal system against a pre-existing one. Quite often these claims considered multiple legal repertoires. At the centre of many of the answers stood an ideal type that approximated the British Empire combining a powerful fiscal-military state at home with a mercantilist system abroad. But this static view has become a lot more fluid in recent years. The editors suggest that transformations of thinking about the universe, the natural world, and the body politic were inseparable from commerce in the seventeenth and eighteenth century. European trading companies, combining as they did joint stock capital, organisation, and a state-backed monopoly, were, indeed, unprecedented. They combined personal with political and economic responsibilities without always drawing clear boundaries between them. Consider, for instance, the classic case of Spain and its empire. The work of Arndt Brendecke and others on information suggests that the ideal of an all-knowing ruler aspiring to dispense justice was confronted with agents in Spain and overseas who filtered, exaggerated, and misinformed. If the annual silver fleet did not arrive in Iberia at the right time, it made a difference in European politics. Slavery stood at the apex of a spectrum of forms of unfree labour that maintained different empires in world history. As such, practices of slaving are central not just to the history of early modern European empires [] , but both to the history of empire and the connected history of Europe more generally. The influx of convict labour that once jump-started sugar, could not maintain it subsequently. For historians, they showcase early modern forms of intersectionality: How ties between status, race, and gender were made in practice and re produced in writing practices. Those organising migration, for instance, accepted work as a payment for passage. They contributed to what some now call the Anthropocene. Imagine for a moment the sight of a silver mine in Peru, a sugar mill on Jamaica, or a hacienda in colonial Mexico. It is a daunting task. Most readers in a modern consumer society, myself included, inhabit a world in which humans decisively impact upon the environment, but in which they often live disconnected from the materiality of imperial production. Human changes to the environment subtly accompanied most of the processes of empire. Every piece of silver intersected in a meaningful way with a vast set of people all embedded in networks of dependency to patrons, family members, and social peers. But they also pushed societies built on interaction, trust, and bonds of family, clientage, and friendship to their natural limits. As this literature review should have made clear, it also led them closer to how historical agents themselves conceived of the worlds they inhabited. A history of early modern empire needs to account for the intersecting roles of individual agents and the intertwined nature of systems in early modern society. Conclusion: Contemporary Problems? Especially historians educated in a European tradition deny that empires of the past can teach policy-makers lessons for today. The task for historians of empire today is, thus, formidable: It requires a substantial commitment to language-learning and scholarly work across continents, an awareness of the striking similarities that existed between early modern empires as well as a careful attention to the minutiae of text and circumstances that constantly undercut these similarities on another analytical plane. It is perhaps an imperial history of a particular moment that bespeaks a political project to intellectually connect parts of the world as some still hope beyond a market rationale. This essay has shown that an approach to early modern empire that operates closer to the older sense of imperium as a set of practices has analytical value. I would argue that it has political value as well for it incentivises historians to speak openly about the material and personal — often unintended — consequences of a globalising world. Foremost, this approach allows historians to combine the stringency of comparison with the surprises of connection. For the sake of a common denominator, comparative history seems to reify containers that many historians shun for good reasons. As historians suggested years ago, comparing also eschews the still primary orientation towards national historiography. Foremost, because comparisons unmake exceptionalisms as Julian Go has argued in an instructive comparison of the British and the US Empire. Investigating the asymmetries of power that allow or disallow them from doing so mitigates a criticism often voiced against connected history: that it seeks out the few mobile agents and neglects the real limits to mobility that confined most people in early modern Europe. Additional value of this approach to empire as practice lies in its chances to personalise. In order allow readers to understand the violence we witness today, Pinker begins by examining the origins of violence; He uses Chimpanzees Which is Witch? What triggered this growth? Likely the end of feudalism. The end of feudal contracts gave people a little more say in their day-to-day working activities, resulting in more time spent at home, which ultimately resulted in childbearing. This would leave citizens scrambling both to provide needs for the population as a whole, and to improve the individuals overall quality of life. Although what caused this iniquity cannot be narrowed down to any one event, there are a number of factors that are more predominant than others. The evolution of many facets of government in addition to naturally occurring disasters, such as crop failure, created a crisis mentality. Our ancestors had a lot on their plate when they discovered new lands and fought new diseases. One of the early forces that had a major impact were the crusades. The long, painful war was composed of a series of battles that were primarily fought on German soil with several nations taking part. Some 20 years before, Rome had fallen. While economic pressures did influence gender roles, their overall impact was less than that of their cultural counterparts. Early Modern Europe started at the beginning of the 15th century and is a period which characterized by prodigious discoveries and inventions. It was also a period of great changes, hardship and wars that paved the way towards the Modern World and the industrial revolution. What evidence might you offer to support this claim, and how might you argue against it? BPQ 3: How did early agricultural societies differ from those of the Paleolithic era? The reason this is, is because in the case of Europe, especially in this time period, power and progress seemed to go hand in hand. What forces worked against such an empire in the sixteenth century? What are some of the common characteristics of the new monarchs? Everyday thinking was influenced by the religious linear historical progression that was distinct and assured, beginning with creation and ending with the Apocalypse as set out in Bible. Between the status of the aristocracy came under threat both politically and socially. Europeans had an extensive range of magical beliefs and practices, mainly due to the Christian belief that magic exists. The elite believed in magic as fervently as the most ignorant peasant. This was a time where nations became established and grew increasingly curious of the world around them. Several technological and intellectual advances occurred during this era. The foundations for national boundaries, the existence and confirmation of faraway continents, the establishment of colonies all took place in this period, and it was a time when globalization in the modern sense came to appear. Though several were unable to read, they became more aware of themselves and humanity compared to their earlier religious views on life, causing them to take a closer look at the human anatomy. Embedded in its history are the many eras of man which have constructed our modern learning, art, beliefs, and order. In Act 3, Scene 1, Hamlet begins a soliloquy in which Shakespeare showcases his literary genius. Strong contrasts of light and shadow enhance the effects of paintings and sculptures. Opera is one of the types of music in the Baroque era. It represented melodic freedom. Baroque era was usually referred to as the thorough-bass period. In early Baroque era no tonal direction existed, but experiments in pre-tonal harmony led to the creation of tonality. Most individuals living in Europe during the 16th and 17th centuries believed that these witches could connect with a different realm to influence the world they found themselves in, the natural world. Sports were a way where many people in society spent their free time. As stated before, the game was originally played with an inflated animal bladder. Many believe that this was due to its almost perfect location between Western Europe and the Eastern shore of the Mediterranean. So what dramatic turn did Europe take during the Inquisition? Many species and creatures evolved and changed through time, leading up to what we know today as, modern man. As time has progressed, things have modified within societies to mold with the new ways of thinking for that time.

What past historians have, thus, often considered a failure to create early institutions served an important political function in harnessing elite rivalry and preventing critique from modern the emperor. For historians, they showcase early modern forms of intersectionality: How ties ap language analysis essay status, race, and gender were made in practice and re produced in writing practices.

It seems crucially important that even inductive approaches that treat empire — like I will in the next part — as a set of practices relate them to a common denominator.

This tradition of envisioning essay reaches back, for instance, to claims to what British and French considered North American hinterlands. Different modern groups could pick and choose from a political history that ran from the Catholic Habsburg Emperors, comparative essay and the multi-ethnic k und k-monarchy into a post-war federal state.

In fact, thinking in terms of families and personal obligation permeated other areas as well. Most of these fossils were comparative in caves.

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Empires used political voids, hijacked existing institutions, and often recruited personnel of the realms they incorporated. Intwo complete essays were found in a cave comparative Spy in Belgium, and more from sites in France inand While these misunderstandings have the potential to raise new questions especially in comparative and connected histories of empire, they also essay definitions in early historiographies. Atlantic and Indian Ocean Worlds, c.

Mla citation of jonathan franzen why bother essay focuses on the many effects it had on the culture of modern Europe and the possibility that it expedited cultural change. In addition to downright force, power relations, of course, crucially hinged on language and mutual perception.

This merely replaces one problem with modern as the comparative literature on statecraft has already shown. These debates register the challenges inherent in attempting to understand a transformation that was at once personal and collective—a matter of inner conviction and outward conformity.

Foremost, this approach allows historians to combine the stringency of comparison with the surprises of connection. Only early historians downplayed its imperial edge, the Holy Roman Empire could be reimagined as a positive alternative to Prussia. I will go through these categories one by one contrasting them with early modern case material. In history as in sociology, the mobility of agents and ideas, discussing and often wildly disagreeing with one another, furthered the process by which different schools intersected.

Empire, Society, and Culture in Britain, Oxford ; id. Our ancestors had a lot on their plate when they discovered new lands and fought new diseases.

Early modern comparative essay

Those organising migration, for instance, accepted work as a payment for passage. From the problems of definitions, it transitions into a discussion of agents of comparative to those who did or un-did modern.

Due to the sheer diversity of early American history today a few recent examples will have to suffice. I am going to provide evidence as to why the world from the early modern era to present day has been connected because of trade. A connected history of empire, by contrast, needs to pay close attention to power structures limiting imperial agents from crossing over from one polity into another. Histories, Empires, Modernities, in: id. It intersected with vibrant national movements in Central and Eastern Europe that helped unpick and reform empire. Quite often these claims considered multiple legal repertoires. But while this inversion of power dynamics sits well with a historiography sceptical of top-down histories of states and empires, it also upsets the very subject under consideration. The Europeans also exchanged plants and animals with the Americas making a better crop foundation there.

At each of these essays of time important political, economic, social, cultural, religious and scientific changes were being made in Western Europe. There is no good reason why historians should not introduce their audiences to big data and comparative structures early the eyes, ears, hands, and mouths of people of the modern.

Early Modern Comparative Approaches to Literary Early Modernity - Oxford Handbooks

Let us consider some examples from the Holy Roman Empire to explore that aspect further. Where historians take the comparative entanglements of those who did empire, foremost their status-driven, familial or dynastic agendas, into consideration, speaking of early modern empires eschews narratives of inevitable modernisation and growing differentiation.

And yet, with many of their day-to-day practices they also did empire. Between the years of the 's and the 's this world has undergone many changes. Colonial Cultures in a Bourgeois World, Berkeleypp. The ruler could take on a central role in embodying that authority, while those inhabiting empire imagined themselves as subjects.

Stephen Howe, Introduction. Let us investigate one caesura comparativetraditionally associated with imperial crisis. Many of these stories were so strikingly similar in different regions not just because they were remade by Western historiography, but because empires responded to the comparable challenge of maintaining loyalty among vast networks of interdependent followers.

What evidence might you offer to support this claim, and how might you argue against it? This review essay starts with thoughts on historiographies of early that shaped the recent literature under consideration here. And they help historians shift the focus from structure to process: extended essay ib history how to empires as state-like entities to empire as a practice that could help some to create and help others to unpick existing institutions.

Depending on the circumstances these courts offered subjects chances to circumvent and challenge intermediary princely powers. The disproportionately large number of essays that Scotland won in British Parliament infor instance, stands out — especially if we consider how North American essays early to achieve a comparable representation in London. Formulating a baseline definition of modern these authors also show how sensitive the imperial rule will always be to the exceptions of day-to-day imperial practice.

These mutual perceptions transformed power into Herrschaft. It represented melodic freedom. Religion was neither on the way out during the early modern period, nor should it be put in too stark a contrast with Enlightened arguments to legitimise empire. Quite often they played both roles at the same time. In Act 3, Scene 1, Hamlet begins a soliloquy in which Shakespeare showcases his literary genius.

Aside from the trade markets and early industrialism, quickly changing thoughts regarding science, God, man and the cosmos propelled political philosophies into uncharted territories. After a lengthy introduction, the thesis is finally stated.

The foundations for national boundaries, the existence and confirmation of faraway continents, the establishment of colonies all took place in this early, and it was a time when globalization in the modern sense came to appear. It is a daunting task. So comparative dramatic turn did Europe take during the Inquisition? Quite often these claims considered multiple legal repertoires.

The Legacy of Eric Williams, Cambridge After the Second World War, the old early modern empire returned, but it looked strikingly non-imperial. Foremost, because comparisons unmake exceptionalisms as Julian Go has argued in an modern comparison of the British and the US Empire. There was also a lasting relationship between Europe, Africa and America because of the sugar and cotton comparative. Modern thinking led to the philosophical essays which helped usher in the acceptance of these thoughts to much of society.

But while this inversion of power dynamics sits well with a historiography sceptical of top-down histories of states and empires, it also upsets the very subject under consideration. The influx of convict labour that once jump-started sugar, could not maintain it modern. A connected history of empire, by contrast, needs to pay close attention to power structures limiting imperial agents from crossing over from one polity into another.

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Early modern comparative essay

While economic pressures did essay gender roles, their overall impact was less than that of their comparative counterparts. His goal with this article is to gain an understanding of popular music in early-modern Europe through trial records of three cases of people modern accused of anti-Catholic sentiment.

I found that Robert S.

Allegations of maleficium were simply the foundation for the crime of witchcraft. Diabolism is what made witchcraft a crime because it involved trading oneself for magical abilities from the Devil xxv. The centre of conflict deriving from the Catholic and Protestant divide, which caused conflict within politics and the military, because the opposing sides fought over religious territory and popularity. In order allow readers to understand the violence we witness today, Pinker begins by examining the origins of violence; He uses Chimpanzees Which is Witch? What triggered this growth? Likely the end of feudalism. The end of feudal contracts gave people a little more say in their day-to-day working activities, resulting in more time spent at home, which ultimately resulted in childbearing. This would leave citizens scrambling both to provide needs for the population as a whole, and to improve the individuals overall quality of life. Although what caused this iniquity cannot be narrowed down to any one event, there are a number of factors that are more predominant than others. The evolution of many facets of government in addition to naturally occurring disasters, such as crop failure, created a crisis mentality. Our ancestors had a lot on their plate when they discovered new lands and fought new diseases. One of the early forces that had a major impact were the crusades. The long, painful war was composed of a series of battles that were primarily fought on German soil with several nations taking part. Some 20 years before, Rome had fallen. While economic pressures did influence gender roles, their overall impact was less than that of their cultural counterparts. Early Modern Europe started at the beginning of the 15th century and is a period which characterized by prodigious discoveries and inventions. It was also a period of great changes, hardship and wars that paved the way towards the Modern World and the industrial revolution. What evidence might you offer to support this claim, and how might you argue against it? BPQ 3: How did early agricultural societies differ from those of the Paleolithic era? The reason this is, is because in the case of Europe, especially in this time period, power and progress seemed to go hand in hand. What forces worked against such an empire in the sixteenth century? What are some of the common characteristics of the new monarchs? Everyday thinking was influenced by the religious linear historical progression that was distinct and assured, beginning with creation and ending with the Apocalypse as set out in Bible. Between the status of the aristocracy came under threat both politically and socially. Europeans had an extensive range of magical beliefs and practices, mainly due to the Christian belief that magic exists. The elite believed in magic as fervently as the most ignorant peasant. This was a time where nations became established and grew increasingly curious of the world around them. Several technological and intellectual advances occurred during this era. The foundations for national boundaries, the existence and confirmation of faraway continents, the establishment of colonies all took place in this period, and it was a time when globalization in the modern sense came to appear. Though several were unable to read, they became more aware of themselves and humanity compared to their earlier religious views on life, causing them to take a closer look at the human anatomy. Embedded in its history are the many eras of man which have constructed our modern learning, art, beliefs, and order. In Act 3, Scene 1, Hamlet begins a soliloquy in which Shakespeare showcases his literary genius. Strong contrasts of light and shadow enhance the effects of paintings and sculptures. Opera is one of the types of music in the Baroque era. It represented melodic freedom. Baroque era was usually referred to as the thorough-bass period. In early Baroque era no tonal direction existed, but experiments in pre-tonal harmony led to the creation of tonality. Most individuals living in Europe during the 16th and 17th centuries believed that these witches could connect with a different realm to influence the world they found themselves in, the natural world. Sports were a way where many people in society spent their free time. As stated before, the game was originally played with an inflated animal bladder. Many believe that this was due to its almost perfect location between Western Europe and the Eastern shore of the Mediterranean. I focus on this period in particular to emphasise the differences between early modern empires and their nineteenth- and twentieth-century counterparts, while, of course, empires can also fruitfully be studied beyond this timeframe. The essay then moves on to the definitions of empire that these historiographies brought forth: definitions that mostly stress commerce or conquest as driving forces of empire. From the problems of definitions, it transitions into a discussion of agents of empire; to those who did or un-did empire. A picture emerges in which personal enrichment and power struggles matter far less than personal obligations. In my conclusion, I return to the management of difference discussed at the onset. I argue that while historians of empire, of course, write histories for our own time of global capitalism , it is worthwhile to consider other imperial rationales: Adhering to deeply gendered familial, dynastic, and religious obligations constituted the distinctive feature of early modern empires. Scholarly exchange, English as a new lingua franca, and approaches that push beyond the nation-state as the natural unit of investigation have brought into conversation and continue to connect distinctive histories of empire. These increasing connections between former national historiographies have produced and continue to produce productive misunderstandings. While these misunderstandings have the potential to raise new questions especially in comparative and connected histories of empire, they also blur definitions in national historiographies. Before discussing definitions in section three, this essay disentangles five examples of prominent imperial historiographies to explain how they have shaped some of the current field. Irish and Scottish critics symbolically embraced a larger European project to reimagine their own unions with England. Oxford pioneered institutionalisation with a chair in In the interwar-period, Cambridge initiated several projects with imperial implications, but these dwarf in comparison to the research done in London. With the return of former servicemen and well-seasoned critics of empire began a formalisation in the curriculum at Cambridge. It is telling that this historiography turned a European male face to the public, but many non-European and female voices were at work in the background. Intriguing connections also existed with some later historian of empire at work outside of Britain such as Eric Eustace Williams. James constituted but one intersection of a new imperial turn and an emerging field shaped by scholars actively involved in the unravelling of empire. In the wake of decolonisation, schools of researchers with new agendas emerged. Members of the Subaltern Studies Collective, for instance, responded to tendencies in South East Asian history to see societies after empire solely through the lens of Western agents and solely in their contribution to the European imperial system. Instead, they proposed to study empire as those subject to imperial rule experienced it. This, they assumed, would uncover the intellectual predicaments and the violence and exploitation of empire-building alongside the roots of resistance that ultimately led to the demise of empires. Subsequent works of synthesis have responded to the upswing in global and world histories. These works have not just further undermined the idea of Europe as a driving force in world history. Some established that European agents played a decidedly marginal role. In the s, early American history developed its own so called Imperial School that took shape around Richard M. The generation that followed them paid more attention to two foundational themes of early American history much closer to home: the role of colonial assemblies and the uneven emergence of slavery as a major labour regime. But it is important to understand both the impact of the Imperial School as well as the focus on the American Revolution. Taking them together, it becomes apparent why historiographical cycles on both sides of the Atlantic were and are not always in sync. The emphasis on the rebellion against an empire as a foundational moment of national history slowed down a critical enquiry into the many unbroken techniques of empire that people carried over into the new American polity. Despite a shared language and often shared forebears, new imperial history of British making, thus, does not always fit easily with its North American counterpart. Due to the sheer diversity of early American history today a few recent examples will have to suffice. They offer major revisions of how we should think of categories such as slavery, information, and labour. It suggests that the diverse set of agents that carried information had to adapt to a region in which war unsettled established political structures. Recent work, thus, points to a long-lasting trend towards a historiography that is growing less and less Anglo-Dutch and Protestant. The decades after the Emperor offered his crown strengthened divisions that ran between a school of history oriented towards the emerging Habsburg-centred composite state and the new self-declared Empire that grew out of its Brandenburg-Prussian fringes. It intersected with vibrant national movements in Central and Eastern Europe that helped unpick and reform empire. After the Second World War, the old early modern empire returned, but it looked strikingly non-imperial. Only where historians downplayed its imperial edge, the Holy Roman Empire could be reimagined as a positive alternative to Prussia. Without painting with too broad a brush, historians contrasted an empire that had teeth and claws and was tied to the rise of National Socialism with an empire of proto-parliaments and religious diversity. This empire ultimately fell victim to centrifugal forces emerging within its large boundaries and due to its outside enemies. Different political groups could pick and choose from a political history that ran from the Catholic Habsburg Emperors, through liberalism and the multi-ethnic k und k-monarchy into a post-war federal state. The Austrian version of enlightened absolutism, so called Joseph in ism, for instance, has just come under critical reinvestigation. After the war, he continued to find allies among critics of the history of ideas and his research on Southeastern Europe was put to new uses during the Cold War. Empire also took on a crucial role in the formation of the social sciences in Europe and the United States to give just one example. Steinmetz seeks to trace their career beyond publications and conferences at home and treats them instead as mobile knowledge brokers. Travelling sociologists actively connected both European networks of knowledge to colonies as well as colonial areas to one another. In history as in sociology, the mobility of agents and ideas, discussing and often wildly disagreeing with one another, furthered the process by which different schools intersected. Historians and sociologists, then, also actively did and un-did empire. Whenever they did, this, in turn, necessitated a renewed interest in definitions of empire and formed ir reconcilable approaches for studying it. Empire has proven chronically hard to define because the definitions of other models of statecraft are in flux as well. For empires in early modern Europe, definitions often hinge on the one hand on absent structural features to emerge in later periods such as mass communication [38] , industrialisation [39] , participatory government [40] , and the great isms racism, colonialism, imperialism, etc. Definitions of empire also often use different contemporary forms of political organisation such as monarchies or republics. The impression, voiced very succinctly by Stephan Wendehorst and others, that definitions of empire have lost their edge is, thus, an indication of something positive and challenging: the increasing connections between a set of scholarly endeavours formerly confined to one academic tradition, language, or region. The teleology of empire from formation, over peak to decomposition and successor states that once set empires in the nineteenth century apart from their early modern counterparts is also wearing thin: Definitions seemed easier when, for instance, an ideal type of the nation-state was available to define empire against. It follows that the close connection between European capitalism and empire also merits a word of warning. Admirers turned his lessons into a full-fledged theory of imperialism as the highest stage of capitalism. These major theorists like Hobson and Lenin, however, always answered to very contemporary problems. Formulating a baseline definition of empire these authors also show how sensitive the imperial rule will always be to the exceptions of day-to-day imperial practice. I will go through these categories one by one contrasting them with early modern case material. This tradition of envisioning empire reaches back, for instance, to claims to what British and French considered North American hinterlands. Territorialised ideas of early modern polities, in fact, sit oddly with many theorists of empire in the world and Europe. More often, they thought of empire in terms of rights in labour, privileges, and people. To be sure, political thinkers formulated legal claims to land that Europeans considered unused and ritualistically took possession of that land. Even if they settled overseas, these settlements remained confined to small, if exploitative pockets until well into the eighteenth century. Groups that were systematically marginalised in the many smaller and larger polities they constituted found access to imperial institutions or the emperor very attractive. Recently, Wendehorst has coined the term Guiccardini-paradigm, after the Renaissance historian who first systematically discussed it, for this phenomenon. The ruler could take on a central role in embodying that authority, while those inhabiting empire imagined themselves as subjects. Let us consider some examples from the Holy Roman Empire to explore that aspect further. Depending on the circumstances these courts offered subjects chances to circumvent and challenge intermediary princely powers. In the Holy Roman Empire, the Emperor, for instance, had agents at local princely courts to negotiate diplomatic relations, a subject Thomas Lau has recently studied. The disproportionately large number of seats that Scotland won in British Parliament in , for instance, stands out — especially if we consider how North American colonists failed to achieve a comparable representation in London. Subjects in the Danish empire shared one faith from the imperial fiefdoms Schleswig and Holstein over Denmark and Norway to Iceland and the Faroe islands. Regime change could also introduce a ruler with a different confessional outlook as was the case in struggles between Protestant Riga and the Polish-Lithuanian king Sigismund II August. Connections between religion and empire, thus, empowered subjects, but they also bolstered an early modern sense of imperial mission and historical purpose 8 that was later often interlaced with concepts of civilisation, progress, and race. Let us investigate one caesura around , traditionally associated with imperial crisis. Maya Jasanoff, for instance, uncovers the fates of roughly 60, who sided with Britain and were displaced during the American Revolutionary War. This entailed demands for imperial reform which closely resembled the demands of American revolutionaries themselves. He explained how magnates in the Ottoman, Safavid and Mughal empires came to rival their imperial overlords. This is for three main reasons: First, it does not disallow anyone from integrating a pluralised notion of modernity as Partha Chatterjee and others have proposed. And, third, it helps frame why those who spoke of empire in the nineteenth century could still invoke family, friends, and kings before speaking of industry, telegraph, or steamship. Much of the debate about definitions also amounts to conflicts between inductive and deductive approaches. But even inductive approaches need to justify why they consider a certain set of practices as imperial. The group of German-speaking historians discussed above who study early modern empires that are usually neglected by imperial history have proposed to focus on techniques, personnel, and institutions within a set definition. It seems crucially important that even inductive approaches that treat empire — like I will in the next part — as a set of practices relate them to a common denominator. This merely replaces one problem with another as the rich literature on statecraft has already shown. As the Roman term imperium suggests, empire was meant to enable people to do something. To be sure, coercion played a central role and violence occurred in early modern power relations, but in most cases it was not the desirable outcome. In addition to downright force, power relations, of course, crucially hinged on language and mutual perception. These mutual perceptions transformed power into Herrschaft. And they help historians shift the focus from structure to process: from empires as state-like entities to empire as a practice that could help some to create and help others to unpick existing institutions. Depending on the empire under consideration, successive historiographical waves have presented a string of contenders. The basic parameters governing how empires could take shape — from above, from below, from between empires or from in-between and across empires and other polities — reflect the historiographical trends outlined in the first part of this essay. Some suggested that metropolitan politicians, merchants, missionaries, and soldiers made empire. In the background, rivalries between empires also continued to exert a crucial influence. These competing claims that rivalling groups haphazardly made empire from above and others instantly unmade it from below also inspired an increasing focus on intermediaries who moved in-between alleged centres and peripheries and between empires. But while this inversion of power dynamics sits well with a historiography sceptical of top-down histories of states and empires, it also upsets the very subject under consideration. If means of coercion were so limited, those who practiced empire either had to share some ideological common ground with distant rulers, or they had to fear coercion enough to comply regardless. To soften the dichotomy, local agents needed to manufacture obedience with their allies. This manufacturing process involved many hands whose personal obligations ranged from friendship, marriage, kinship, fiefdom, vassalage, and servitude to bonds of money and ideology. To the contrary, protecting the British Isles and interrupting trade patterns dominated naval strategising.

If means of coercion were so limited, those who practiced empire either had to share comparative ideological essay ground with distant rulers, or they had to fear coercion early to comply regardless. I focus on this period in particular to emphasise the differences between early modern empires and their nineteenth- and twentieth-century counterparts, while, of course, empires can comparative fruitfully be studied beyond this timeframe.

Religious agents occupied a major role as critics and promoters of empire. Benedikt Stuchtey, Ein liberales Weltreich? It is modern an imperial history of a particular moment that bespeaks a political project to intellectually connect parts of the world as some still hope beyond a market rationale. Allegations of maleficium were simply the foundation for the crime of witchcraft.

It is a early introduction to empire by way of a critical journey through some works recently published in the German, Austrian, British, and American academic traditions. The medieval period is modern into the sub-categories of early medievalcentral middle ageslate medievaland followed by the early modern period In the wake of decolonisation, schools of researchers essay new agendas emerged.

Much of the debate about definitions also amounts to conflicts between inductive and deductive approaches.

Early modern comparative essay

This is for three comparative reasons: First, it does not disallow anyone from integrating a pluralised notion of modernity as Partha Chatterjee and others have proposed. InAntony G. It is modern that this historiography turned a European male face to the public, but many modern and female voices were at work in the background. In the Holy Roman Empire, the Emperor, for essay, had agents at local princely courts to negotiate early relations, a subject Thomas Lau has early studied.

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It represented melodic freedom. Baroque era was usually referred to as the thorough-bass period. In early Baroque era no tonal direction existed, but experiments in pre-tonal harmony led to the creation of tonality. Most individuals living in Europe during the 16th and 17th centuries believed that these witches could connect with a different realm to influence the world they found themselves in, the natural world. Sports were a way where many people in society spent their free time. As stated before, the game was originally played with an inflated animal bladder. Many believe that this was due to its almost perfect location between Western Europe and the Eastern shore of the Mediterranean. So what dramatic turn did Europe take during the Inquisition? Many species and creatures evolved and changed through time, leading up to what we know today as, modern man. As time has progressed, things have modified within societies to mold with the new ways of thinking for that time. Between the years of the 's and the 's this world has undergone many changes. Focusing on Europe, the major forces of change were in politics, economics, and religion. The medieval period is split into the sub-categories of early medieval , central middle ages , late medieval , and followed by the early modern period At each of these periods of time important political, economic, social, cultural, religious and scientific changes were being made in Western Europe. However, things started to change during the 16th century. The art dates to about 40, years ago, and on the island of Sulawesi in Indonesia and certain areas of Africa, there is evidence suggesting that art may have earlier origins Indonesian Cave Paintings As Old As Europe 's Ancient Art. In , two complete skeletons were found in a cave near Spy in Belgium, and more from sites in France in , and These and other finds showed that the Neanderthals had populated Europe widely from about , to 28, years ago after which they became extinct. Most of these fossils were found in caves. Usually they are associated with cold adapted species such as reindeer, arctic fox, lemming and mammoth. The people of the age were faced with upheaval of all forms; religious, social, political and even economical. Religious upheaval stemmed from changes in religious views and practises. The Reformation was a hugely significant event that took place in the years spanning Before this time period, witchcraft, sorcery, and maleficium magic were dismissed as false superstition. It focuses on the many effects it had on the culture of medieval Europe and the possibility that it expedited cultural change. I found that Robert S. Gottfried had two main theses in the book. He argued that rodent and insect life cycles, as well as the changing of weather systems affect plague. He claimed that the devastation plague causes is partly due to its perpetual recurrences. Accordingly, it emerged a unified polity and administration, first under Prophet Muhammad and then the first Caliph Abu Bakr that set the stage for the early Arab conquests. The Europeans also exchanged plants and animals with the Americas making a better crop foundation there. There was also a lasting relationship between Europe, Africa and America because of the sugar and cotton trade. The European empires needed more workers so the salve trade started linking America, Africa and Europe. This also made for dispersed people in many different parts of the western hemisphere of African origin. I am going to provide evidence as to why the world from the early modern era to present day has been connected because of trade. Evidence A. The Atlantic Slave Trade The Atlantic Slave Trade is a prime example of how the world from the early modern era is connected because of trade. Aside from the trade markets and early industrialism, quickly changing thoughts regarding science, God, man and the cosmos propelled political philosophies into uncharted territories. Modern thinking led to the philosophical writings which helped usher in the acceptance of these thoughts to much of society. It can be said that if the crusades not happened, then western surgical practices could have remained stagnant and inferior to the practices throughout the rest of the world. The hospital system throughout early medieval Europe was heavily dependent upon. Maya Jasanoff, for instance, uncovers the fates of roughly 60, who sided with Britain and were displaced during the American Revolutionary War. This entailed demands for imperial reform which closely resembled the demands of American revolutionaries themselves. He explained how magnates in the Ottoman, Safavid and Mughal empires came to rival their imperial overlords. This is for three main reasons: First, it does not disallow anyone from integrating a pluralised notion of modernity as Partha Chatterjee and others have proposed. And, third, it helps frame why those who spoke of empire in the nineteenth century could still invoke family, friends, and kings before speaking of industry, telegraph, or steamship. Much of the debate about definitions also amounts to conflicts between inductive and deductive approaches. But even inductive approaches need to justify why they consider a certain set of practices as imperial. The group of German-speaking historians discussed above who study early modern empires that are usually neglected by imperial history have proposed to focus on techniques, personnel, and institutions within a set definition. It seems crucially important that even inductive approaches that treat empire — like I will in the next part — as a set of practices relate them to a common denominator. This merely replaces one problem with another as the rich literature on statecraft has already shown. As the Roman term imperium suggests, empire was meant to enable people to do something. To be sure, coercion played a central role and violence occurred in early modern power relations, but in most cases it was not the desirable outcome. In addition to downright force, power relations, of course, crucially hinged on language and mutual perception. These mutual perceptions transformed power into Herrschaft. And they help historians shift the focus from structure to process: from empires as state-like entities to empire as a practice that could help some to create and help others to unpick existing institutions. Depending on the empire under consideration, successive historiographical waves have presented a string of contenders. The basic parameters governing how empires could take shape — from above, from below, from between empires or from in-between and across empires and other polities — reflect the historiographical trends outlined in the first part of this essay. Some suggested that metropolitan politicians, merchants, missionaries, and soldiers made empire. In the background, rivalries between empires also continued to exert a crucial influence. These competing claims that rivalling groups haphazardly made empire from above and others instantly unmade it from below also inspired an increasing focus on intermediaries who moved in-between alleged centres and peripheries and between empires. But while this inversion of power dynamics sits well with a historiography sceptical of top-down histories of states and empires, it also upsets the very subject under consideration. If means of coercion were so limited, those who practiced empire either had to share some ideological common ground with distant rulers, or they had to fear coercion enough to comply regardless. To soften the dichotomy, local agents needed to manufacture obedience with their allies. This manufacturing process involved many hands whose personal obligations ranged from friendship, marriage, kinship, fiefdom, vassalage, and servitude to bonds of money and ideology. To the contrary, protecting the British Isles and interrupting trade patterns dominated naval strategising. Scholars have reinvestigated, for instance, the role of the Navy as a forum for critique in the period leading up to the British Civil War and identified the Navy as a source of discontent in the American crisis. In fact, thinking in terms of families and personal obligation permeated other areas as well. Historians of early modern Spain and its empire have already gone far in advancing this notion. The remainder of this section looks at some of these practices of empire in more detail. Empires used political voids, hijacked existing institutions, and often recruited personnel of the realms they incorporated. Imperial stability, thus, crucially depended on a degree of flexibility that an instructive comparison of Qing China and Imperial Rome delineates. When and how depended on the social clout of those who uttered these words. In , Antony G. Power lies not just in conquest, but in claiming the authority to forge the story of empire and define what preceded it [] : Imperial narratives even inverted the relationality of colonial violence, turning the colonised into perpetrators. Chatterjee, for instance, shows how Thomas Babbington Macaulay utilised a version of an almost forgotten event in Mughal India, the death of a group of imprisoned British soldiers in Calcutta, to present the British as a civilising force in a disorderly and despotic India. Many of these stories were so strikingly similar in different regions not just because they were remade by Western historiography, but because empires responded to the comparable challenge of maintaining loyalty among vast networks of interdependent followers. Religious agents occupied a major role as critics and promoters of empire. Quite often they played both roles at the same time. Religion was neither on the way out during the early modern period, nor should it be put in too stark a contrast with Enlightened arguments to legitimise empire. Imperial religious fervour no longer pertains to Catholics or a small group of radical Protestants in New England either. British historians have argued that the first post-Reformation empire was born out of militant Protestantism, and grappled from the start with its inbuilt heterodoxy. It helped agents to reshape empires. Successions drew imperial networks in sharp relief as they were often accompanied by purges or struggles over rights to particular subjects, territories or privileges. Furthermore, taking dynastic thought seriously sets Europe apart from other dynastic systems: Agnatic primogeniture, monogamous marriage, and Salic law framed political conflict. At the same time the focus on the rule of the first-born son from a legitimate marriage also created dynastic crises well into the eighteenth century. Faruqui convincingly shows how the critique of a prince pierced through layers of courtly etiquette that otherwise prevented a discussion of policies. What past historians have, thus, often considered a failure to create modern institutions served an important political function in harnessing elite rivalry and preventing critique from damaging the emperor. Subjects in empires also made sophisticated legal claims that did not merely pit an imposed legal system against a pre-existing one. Quite often these claims considered multiple legal repertoires. At the centre of many of the answers stood an ideal type that approximated the British Empire combining a powerful fiscal-military state at home with a mercantilist system abroad. But this static view has become a lot more fluid in recent years. The editors suggest that transformations of thinking about the universe, the natural world, and the body politic were inseparable from commerce in the seventeenth and eighteenth century. European trading companies, combining as they did joint stock capital, organisation, and a state-backed monopoly, were, indeed, unprecedented. They combined personal with political and economic responsibilities without always drawing clear boundaries between them. Consider, for instance, the classic case of Spain and its empire. The work of Arndt Brendecke and others on information suggests that the ideal of an all-knowing ruler aspiring to dispense justice was confronted with agents in Spain and overseas who filtered, exaggerated, and misinformed. If the annual silver fleet did not arrive in Iberia at the right time, it made a difference in European politics. Slavery stood at the apex of a spectrum of forms of unfree labour that maintained different empires in world history. As such, practices of slaving are central not just to the history of early modern European empires [] , but both to the history of empire and the connected history of Europe more generally. The influx of convict labour that once jump-started sugar, could not maintain it subsequently. For historians, they showcase early modern forms of intersectionality: How ties between status, race, and gender were made in practice and re produced in writing practices. Those organising migration, for instance, accepted work as a payment for passage. They contributed to what some now call the Anthropocene. Imagine for a moment the sight of a silver mine in Peru, a sugar mill on Jamaica, or a hacienda in colonial Mexico. It is a daunting task. Most readers in a modern consumer society, myself included, inhabit a world in which humans decisively impact upon the environment, but in which they often live disconnected from the materiality of imperial production. Human changes to the environment subtly accompanied most of the processes of empire. Every piece of silver intersected in a meaningful way with a vast set of people all embedded in networks of dependency to patrons, family members, and social peers. But they also pushed societies built on interaction, trust, and bonds of family, clientage, and friendship to their natural limits. As this literature review should have made clear, it also led them closer to how historical agents themselves conceived of the worlds they inhabited. A history of early modern empire needs to account for the intersecting roles of individual agents and the intertwined nature of systems in early modern society. Conclusion: Contemporary Problems? Especially historians educated in a European tradition deny that empires of the past can teach policy-makers lessons for today. The task for historians of empire today is, thus, formidable: It requires a substantial commitment to language-learning and scholarly work across continents, an awareness of the striking similarities that existed between early modern empires as well as a careful attention to the minutiae of text and circumstances that constantly undercut these similarities on another analytical plane. It is perhaps an imperial history of a particular moment that bespeaks a political project to intellectually connect parts of the world as some still hope beyond a market rationale. This essay has shown that an approach to early modern empire that operates closer to the older sense of imperium as a set of practices has analytical value. I would argue that it has political value as well for it incentivises historians to speak openly about the material and personal — often unintended — consequences of a globalising world. Foremost, this approach allows historians to combine the stringency of comparison with the surprises of connection. For the sake of a common denominator, comparative history seems to reify containers that many historians shun for good reasons. As historians suggested years ago, comparing also eschews the still primary orientation towards national historiography. Foremost, because comparisons unmake exceptionalisms as Julian Go has argued in an instructive comparison of the British and the US Empire. Investigating the asymmetries of power that allow or disallow them from doing so mitigates a criticism often voiced against connected history: that it seeks out the few mobile agents and neglects the real limits to mobility that confined most people in early modern Europe. Additional value of this approach to empire as practice lies in its chances to personalise. There is no good reason why historians should not introduce their audiences to big data and social structures through the eyes, ears, hands, and mouths of people of the past. Sweet introduces his readers to an enslaved man from the fringes of the expanding kingdom of Dahomey in West Africa who traversed the Portuguese Atlantic. Ann M. Little traces the captivity of Esther Wheelwright, a New Englander, born Protestant and raised among free and enslaved women in Maine, converting to Catholicism at age six among the Wabanaki Indians, and choosing to spend her life as an Ursuline nun in Quebec. But few men such as Montesquieu, Burke, and Gibbon created narratives about their rise and fall. Notes: [1] This essay has benefited from discussions with fellow students and colleagues in Cambridge, Freiburg im Breisgau, New Haven, and Princeton. Benedikt Stuchtey, Ein liberales Weltreich? Strategien und Motive im Jahrhundert, Frankfurt am Main , pp. Encounters and Transfers in the Long Nineteenth Century, 2nd ed. Refiguring Imperial Terrains, in: id. Perdue eds. Stephen Howe, Introduction. New Imperial Histories, in: id. Histories, Empires, Modernities, in: id. Hopkins, Back to the Future. Rethinking a Research Agenda, in: id.

For reasons that I will discuss later, a particularly vibrant Anglophone strand, for instance, stresses connections between politics, commerce, and imperial expansion, modern defined the British Empire in essay. Introduction Empires manage difference. Jahrhundert, Frankfurt am Mainpp. The emphasis on the rebellion against an empire as a foundational moment of early history slowed down a critical enquiry into the many unbroken techniques of empire that people carried over into the new American polity.

Early Modern Europe Essay | Bartleby

Sweet introduces his readers to an enslaved man from the fringes of the early kingdom of Dahomey in West Africa who traversed the Portuguese Atlantic. In the interwar-period, Cambridge initiated several projects with imperial implications, but these dwarf in comparison to the research done in London.

Despite a shared language and often shared forebears, new imperial history of British essay, thus, does not always fit modern with its North American counterpart.