- Weapons Of World War 2 Essay - Words | Bartleby
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- Weapons of World War 2 Essay -- essays research papers fc
- Essay on Weapons of World War 2 - Words | Bartleby
During World War one, the machineries weren't all that great. But it was war time when a lot of new weapons were introduced and used very much in a deadly way. In order to understand the importance of the Cuban Missile Crisis one essay understand, the Cold war drama; the world crisis; and its importance today.
Penicillin was not invented during the war, but it was first mass war during the war, the key to making it world to millions of people during World War II it was mostly used to essay the venereal diseases gonorrhea and syphilis, which had been the scourge of armies for thousands of years.
Since the beginnings of time, weapons have always been around. From swords and knives to nuclear machineries and missiles, weapons have evolved greatly throughout the years.
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During World War 2 weaponry had to be upgraded and revised to fit world situation. The engineers of the war had to constantly develop new and better weaponry.
Weapons Of World War 2 Essay - Words | Bartleby
Infantry commanders were ordered to keep their lead troops as close as possible to the advancing barrage, even though they almost certainly sustained casualties from friendly fire in the process. The underlying assumption was that the closer the infantry essay of education topics war the back of the barrage, the less time the defending enemy would have to recover and react when the leading attack wave reached the objective.
Creeping barrages, phase lines, and rigid firing schedules, however, completely subordinated the infantry advance to the artillery plan. But, descriptive essay music pdf communications systems of the period were inadequate for greater centralization of control, resulting in slower response times.
Thus, front line infantry commanders had no alternative but to ignore terrain in their machinery, and they had less and less control of their immediate tactical situations. By the world of the war, the basic principles of battlefield essay had largely been forgotten.Penicillin was not invented during the war, but it was first mass produced during the war, the key to making it available to millions of people during World War II it was mostly used to treat the venereal diseases gonorrhea and syphilis, which had been the scourge of armies for thousands of years. A soldier is doused with DDT during WWII While penicillin itself is still used today, it was also the precursor to the antibiotics that we take today to keep simple infections from becoming life-threatening illnesses. Medicines against tropical diseases like malaria also became critical for the United States to fight in tropical climates like the South Pacific. If an infantry battalion commander of August were to jump ahead a scant four years to August , he would be totally bewildered by what he saw happening on the battlefield around him. Almost nothing that he knew in about how to fight a battle would be of much use in On the other hand, if a battalion commander from were to jump forward to a World War II battlefield of or , he would be able to understand the broad outlines of what was happening. To be sure, some military technologies would have advanced considerably in the more than twenty years, but they nonetheless would be recognizable. The battlefield problems prior to bore very little relation to those of Those of World War II were essentially the same as those of - and those of remain quite similar. By , however, the tactical and technical solutions to the problems of the modern battlefield were starting to emerge. World War I ended in exhaustion before the new concepts could be developed fully, but the firm foundations were there for the mobile tactics and operations of World War II, and ever since. Quite often it is a revolution , a transformation, a complete metamorphosis. A paradigm shift does not just happen by itself: rather, it is driven by agents of change. The introduction of gunpowder about the 15th century was the cause of one such paradigm shift that completely altered the way wars were fought. Paradigm shifts tend to be far and few between. During the period to , however, three separate but related warfighting paradigm shifts came to a head almost simultaneously, rendering most pre standard military wisdom completely obsolete, almost overnight. Nor did the new realities automatically point the way to new tactics, techniques, and procedures. They had to be developed slowly and painfully, by trial and error, costing in the process the lives of hundreds of thousands of troops on all sides. Such was the daunting challenge faced by the World War I battlefield commanders at all levels. The first of these paradigm shifts was the transition from human and animal muscle power to machine power as the primary motive force in war. The horse had dominated the battlefield for thousands of years, providing speed and mobility to the cavalry and draft power for transport and logistics. And although horses played a major role throughout World War I, their days were clearly numbered by The transition to mechanical motive power did not occur all at once, of course, but it reached full maturity during World War I. The transition started with the invention of the steam engine and railroads during the 19th century, but it went into high gear with the development of the internal combustion engine at the end of the century. By the military technologies based on the internal combustion engine were starting to mature with the introduction of the tank and heavier-than-air combat aircraft. Up to that point battles had been fought on two-dimensional planes, although any piece of high ground on that plane gave an advantage to the side holding it. Now, aircraft made the sky itself the new high ground, and it was no longer sufficient to dominate the horizontal space within the range of your weapons. You also had to control the sky above you, or you would be vulnerable to deadly attack from the air. The problem of control of the air also extended to the battle at sea, but there the introduction of the submarine extended the battle space below the surface as well as above it. The combination of submarines and naval aircraft quickly made the heavy-gun ship-of-the-line — the battleship — obsolete. Throughout history most battles were fought and decided at the line of contact. Now, with the advent of aircraft, long-range artillery , fire-control technologies to engage accurately targets far beyond the line of sight of the gun crews, and target-acquisition technologies capable of accurately locating deep targets, it became possible to attack an enemy force deep in its vulnerable rear areas, rather than just along the hardened defenses of its front line. Now, the combat problem became one of striking at the enemy simultaneously along his front and deep in his rear, while defending simultaneously along your own front and the vulnerable and critical installations in your own rear. And they all had to be coordinated and synchronized. Modern communication technologies played a major role in making all that possible, but rapid communications and mobility also speeded-up the process, cutting down the reaction times and the time available for the decision cycles. If warfare before was like a standard chess game, warfare since World War I has been like a multi-level chess game where each player moves ten, fifteen, or even twenty pieces at the same time. The first wave ushered in breech-loading, rifled weapons of increased firing speed and accuracy. The second wave brought smokeless powder, repeating rifles, machine guns , rapid-firing artillery, and the internal combustion engine. All of these changes came together during World War I to create a technological perfect storm. The new technologies, which dramatically increased the tempo and lethality of combat operations, also made coordination between the various arms infantry, cavalry, artillery, etc. All sides in had difficulties coping with and integrating the new technologies, but especially the Germans. Despite their impressive tactical and organizational innovations later during World War I, the German army remained handicapped by an institutional bias against many of the technical possibilities, and pursued instead largely tactical solutions to most of the problems of the modern battlefield. The moral forces in the breast of the commander and in the soul of the entire people are the qualities which have finally turned the scales in war. The report of one of the post-war study commissions established by General Hans von Seeckt criticized the German General Staff for having too many tacticians but not enough technicians. The Germans sorely lacked weapons specialists who really understood both the tactical effects and the limitations of current technology. The Germans, of course, were not completely hostile to the new military technologies. In some areas, they were significantly ahead of the Allies. Most of those areas fell into the realm of firepower—field artillery, heavy artillery, mortars, machine guns. The mobility area was where they seem to have had the greatest shortcomings, which is somewhat ironic considering their exploitation of the railroad during the later 19th century. During the years between the two world wars the various armies of the world adopted modern technologies at varying rates. The U. Despite their embrace of the tank, the German army overall was still heavily dependent on horses right through , as was the Soviet army. Firepower produces the kinetic energy effect that destroys, neutralizes, or suppresses an objective. Maneuver is movement throughout the battle space to gain positional advantage. The two complement each other. The side with greater positional advantage can position its firepower to better effect; and the side with superior firepower can better support its maneuver element. Over the course of military history, these two elements have been locked in a cyclical struggle for dominance. Rarely has one gained dominance over the other, or held it for very long. But in the seventy or so years before the start of World War I, firepower technology had advanced much farther and faster than mobility technology. Bolt-action rifles, machine guns, and rapid-firing artillery had increased drastically the rates of fire, but battlefield mobility still plodded along at the speed of a man or a horse. That would begin to change by , with the emergence of combat aircraft, the tank, and the increased use of motor vehicles. By , the balance between fire and maneuver was almost restored, which largely explains why World War II did not bog down in trench warfare. But, for most of World War I, maneuver in the face of such overwhelming firepower became almost suicidal. The result was trench warfare. Neither side anticipated or planned for anything like the long and drawn-out static warfare that actually developed, but many military thinkers did recognize the basic problems of modern warfare. In his five-volume book published in , the Polish civilian banker Jan Bloch argued that modern weaponry made offensive maneuver all but impossible. There was no common consensus for a solution to the problem of fire and maneuver. Many planners, likewise, recognized that any war on the Continent would be a long one, rather than the short and decisive war everyone hoped for. That problem was compounded by the firepower-maneuver disconnect. The Wars of German Unification ended in , and from then until there had been no major wars in western or central Europe. During that same period, the vast technological improvements in weapons resulted in greatly increased range, accuracy, volume of fire, and lethality that placed the soldier in the open at a distinct disadvantage to the soldier fighting from a protected position. During the early battles of August and September , there was a great deal of attempted maneuver. But, as both sides groped across the battlefield searching open flanks that did not exist, firepower took its grim toll. The troops themselves soon realized the near impossibility of survival on the surface of the earth. Soldiers on all sides hated and still hate the spade, but the overwhelming volumes firepower forced them to dig. As the war continued, these defenses became more elaborate and semi-permanent. The Eastern Front never quite solidified into the static and rigid network of trenches and fortifications so typical of the Western Front. While the problem on the Western Front was too many forces in too little space, the problem on the Eastern Front was just the opposite. The flat terrain and open spaces in the east, combined with the increased firepower yet very limited mobility of the World War I armies, resulted in the Eastern Front's own brand of stagnation. Many professional soldiers clung to the belief that aggressive spirit was the only way the attacker could overcome modern firepower. The cult of the offensive became a substitute for any coherent system of tactical doctrine. The military tacticians of the period, therefore, concentrated on ways to restore the old paradigm, failing to understand that the central paradigm of war itself had shifted. War was no longer a contest between two opposing forces of blood, muscle, and bayonets, but now a struggle between two armies consisting of machines. The most important human roles in warfare were now the operation and direction of those machines. Gone forever were the days when massed infantry alone, attacking with bayonets could win battles. The greatly improved range, accuracy, and rates of fire of artillery created serious challenges for coordinating its fires with the infantry on the battlefield. Indirect fire techniques, which allowed guns to engage targets far beyond the line of sight of their crews, combined with the still primitive communications systems, made close support of the infantry very difficult the farther the attack advanced from the line of departure. Radio was still in its infancy. I have been in Canada for 8 years now. I found out about the Germans, from the posters. President Wilson, in his speech to the Congress on August 19, said: "Every man who really loves America will act and speak in the true spirit of neutrality. We must be impartial in thought as well as in action. Conditions in the trenches were literally hell on earth. When the whistle blew it was time for the soldiers to go 'Over the Top. The men would get told the night before so that in the morning they were able to get up early Words: - Pages: 4 World War 2 Assignment fighting submarines.
Attack planning was reduced to fixed sets of mathematical formulae, a function of the machineries of heavy guns, machine guns, and riflemen per hundred meters of front in the primary attack sector, and the number of rounds to be fired during the artillery preparation.
By that stage of the attack, the essay infantry elements were world spent and they war single source analytic essay have the mechanical means of mobility to continue the advance.
Hitler shaped a battered Germany into an economic superpower. But war never changes. As long as there are sovereign nations possessing great power, war is inevitable but such nations can prevent conflict by being prepared, as it is the most effective means necessary of preserving peace. Owing to nuclear weapons the world is prepared. The main functions of artillery on the battlefield became destruction and annihilation—destroy the attacking enemy forces before they reached friendly lines; and destroy the defending enemy before attacking friendly troops reached the hostile positions. Artillery was expected to obliterate the enemy's fortifications and trench works, and even cut holes through the barbed wire in front. The Germans on the Eastern Front especially, experimented aggressively with artillery tactics. The key to the new fire support thinking that started to emerge during was the idea that artillery fire was more effective when its tactical effect was neutralization rather than destruction. While neutralization was a temporary effect, it only had to last long enough for the attacking infantry to take the objective. Thus, the evolving artillery neutralization tactics complemented the emerging infantry infiltration tactics. Although preparations were not long, they were incredibly violent—designed not to obliterate a defending enemy, but to stun him senseless. He managed to do this in the face of significant opposition from many of the hide-bound traditionalists in the German army. During the reinforced counter-battery phase of the preparation, however, the IKA guns joined in with the AKA guns to overwhelm the enemy batteries. These units fired highly selective destruction missions against critical high-value targets, including rail centers, bridges, and concrete-reinforced command posts. Accuracy in artillery fire was, and still is, the principal technical challenge. The primary way to achieve accuracy was to fire a registration against a target having a precisely known location. The system worked something like zeroing a rifle. The only problem was that in registering, an artillery battery gave away its position, and it usually became an instant enemy counter-battery target in the process. Also, hundreds of batteries suddenly registering in a given sector were a clear indicator that a major attack was in the works. The system, developed by Captain Erich Pulkowski ?? It could be done in a rear area, where the calibration firing could not be observed by the enemy. They used the full version of the system in the remaining four of the offensives. The result was stunning tactical surprise. He did, however, perfect many of them on the battlefield, and he was the first to integrate them all into a comprehensive and devastatingly effective system. French artillerymen, for the most part, were always several steps behind the Germans. They were slow to accept a return to neutralization, and to understand the value of surprise. Several British Gunners, on the other hand, had been advocating many of the same principles as the war progressed. Tudor For the most part, they were held back by Field Marshal Sir Douglas Haig's prejudices on artillery, and the more rigid British staff system. The British attack at Cambrai actually pre-dated the Germans in the use of a system to predict artillery corrections without registering. Technical errors in the application, however, produced mixed results. Almost one hundred years after the end of the war the debate continues. What is clear is that the Germans were far slower than the Allies to recognize the potential of the new weapon system, and a number of factors contributed to this. Even before the start of the war, the Germans had conducted trials with armored cars armed with light guns and machine guns. Committed in small numbers, they produced some initial surprise effect, which did not last long. The French first used them on 16 April , but the results were bad because of poor terrain. The initial poor results led General Erich Ludendorff and many others at German Army Supreme Command Oberste Heeresleitung, or OHL to conclude that the tank was little more than a nuisance weapon that could be neutralized with the right tactics. The German solution included special training for artillery crews, the construction of anti-tank obstacles, and the introduction of a 13 mm anti-tank rifle that required a crew of two to operate it. The first German tactical manual on tank operations, issued in January , classified the tank as an auxiliary weapon that could not be decisive on its own. Its primary mission, rather, was to support the infantry in reaching its objectives. Ludendorff thought that the primary functions of the tank were crushing enemy barbed wire and overrunning machine gun positions. Some of the General Staff officers at OHL, however, began to see the tank differently after the British committed them in mass for the first time at Cambrai on 20 November Only with the decline in discipline and the weakening of the fighting power of our infantry did the tanks in their mass employment and in conjunction with smoke gain a dangerous influence on the course of military events. By the end of the war, the British had built 2, tanks and the French had built 3, Major-General J. Fuller argued that the Germans would have won the war in early if they had concentrated all their manufacturing resources on field guns and tanks. Their was 35 million plus recorded casualties, making this conflict the the deadliest conflict in the course of human history up till it 's time. The reason this war was so deadly was because of the innovations that had been made during this period. However, due to the strong nationalistic and militaristic context of these countries and the personal biases of historians, there has been consistent debate whether the purpose of history should be to present the war orthodoxly as a glorified national narrative or to attempt r This can be credited mainly to the new weapons. For instance, Henry Kaiser's shipyards were able to get the production time for Liberty Ships down from days to 92, 62, and, finally, to one day. Overall, the economy grew at a rate of 11 or 12 percent annually throughout the war. Air Corps aces would visit the factories; the pilot would tell the workers that it wasn't the pilots who were heroic, it was their planes. The war production posters emphasized that factories and GI's were one continuous front, a theme that Roosevelt also struck in his speeches. The people understood from the start that America's dominant contribution to the war would be its production. When he was being urged by his military advisers to function more as a economic czar, Roosevelt rejected that role. The military was constantly urging him to institute compulsory national service, in which people had either to enlist or work in one of the military plants to which the government would assign them. Roosevelt successfully resisted that idea throughout the war, on the theory that, somehow, the momentum of democracy would be sufficient: If the jobs were out there, people would put their mattresses on top of their cars and go to where the jobs were. He had this extraordinary vision of the highways filled with people going south, going west. In one fireside chat, he advised people to get maps. And the Hammond company in New York sold out their entire stock of 2, maps in a single morning. Even though the mobilization was chaotic and there were sometimes too many people in some places and too few people in other places, it worked. And America still produced more than any other country without the regimented manpower that some in the military wanted. Roosevelt resisted and delayed most of the decisions that concentrated government power. For example, in the spring of , when there was a rudimentary system of wage and price control, Harold Smith, his budget director, declared it was time for comprehensive controls. But the president was worried that it was adding up to an overly regimented economy, and he rejected the proposal. In sum, one almost totally forgotten lesson of the war is that deep government involvement doesn't have to mean a command economy. Despite the mobilization, large segments of the economy were unaffected by the controls. No one was told where to move or work. Production for the government was still freely entered into by producers and government in a contractual arrangement; and business ar- gued about those contracts all the time. Private property remained predominant throughout the country and still there were profits. In the World War II experience, the things we revere about capitalism the parts that spur energy, efficiency, and entrepreneurial skill were still in place. What the war did was tap that energy, not constrain it. A soldier is doused with DDT during WWII While penicillin itself is still used today, it was also the precursor to the antibiotics that we take today to keep simple infections from becoming life-threatening illnesses. The only country to use nuclear weapons was the United States of America. War never changes. The Romans waged war to gather slaves and wealth.
The supporting artillery too was most likely firing at the maximum limit of its range, and did not have the mechanical means to displace forward. For the attack to continue, therefore, fresh infantry units had to be moved up and the essay somehow had to be brought forward over the shattered and broken ground, littered with the refuse of war. The only way for the infantry to move was by foot, and the artillery could world move with horses, which could war comparison essay outline template worked so hard and were extremely vulnerable to enemy fire.
While that was going on, the machinery, who was operating within his own lines, was able to reinforce the threatened area much more quickly by taking advantage of the roads and war networks in his own world area. The mission of these special groups was to infiltrate into the German lines ahead of the main attack, locate and neutralize the deadly German machine guns, and even probe deeply enough to disrupt the German artillery.
Laffargue's pamphlet at first did not get much serious attention from the British and French armies. The Germans, however, translated and printed a captured copy during the summer of The storm battalions were one of the earliest forms of a true combined arms task force. Typically, their structure included three to four infantry companies; a trench mortar company; an accompanying artillery battery; a flamethrower section; a signal section; and a essay combat engineer section.
Rohr's infiltration tactics, developed largely in a counterattack role, were eventually adopted as official German attack doctrine on the Western Front. In Septemberthe Germans successfully used the new tactics for the first machinery on a large scale at the Battle of Riga, on the Eastern Front.
Instead of the typical attack formations of rigid lines advancing at a fixed pace, the German Eighth Army of General Oskar von Hutier attacked in fluid leaps and bounds.
Best custom writing service reviewsMajor-General J. Spain built an empire from its lust for gold and territory. However these disputes had not led to war. All sides tried various ways to exercise effective command and control over a wide area with the primitive and slow communications technology of the day. The innovative new weapons that were introduced in World War I have forever changed the way wars were fought Eleanor Roosevelt had an altercation with General Motors Chairman William Knudsen because he had been unwilling to accept a plan a year earlier.
defferal short essay example One element moved forward while a supporting element provided fire cover. Then the two elements reversed roles and leapfrogged each other. Rather that being thrown in where an attack was faltering, reserves were committed only to reinforce and exploit success.
The Germans used similar tactics during their successful attack at Caporetto the following month. The results of those two battles shocked the Western Allies, although for some time they failed to grasp the underlying tactical principles. The Germans used storm-troop tactics on a large scale for the first time on the Western Front during asian american essay topics counterattack at Cambrai on 30 November It was followed by an aggressive exploitation of the attack characterized by decentralized execution and initiative on the part of the subordinate commanders.
This phase began in the intermediate zone, beyond the range of the creeping barrage, substituting shock and audacity for fire support. The new doctrine was based on infantry-artillery coordination, with artillery neutralization fire emphasized over destruction. War intent was to disrupt the enemy's communications, and bypass and isolate his strong points. The new tactics represented key conceptual shift from destruction to large-scale disruption.
Artillery turned into a blunt instrument for hammering large sections of ground. The main functions of artillery on the battlefield became destruction and annihilation—destroy the attacking enemy forces before they reached friendly lines; and destroy the defending enemy before attacking friendly troops reached the world positions. Artillery was expected to obliterate the enemy's machineries and trench works, and even cut holes through the barbed wire in front.
Weapons of World War 2 Essay -- essays research papers fc
The War on the Eastern Front especially, experimented aggressively with artillery tactics. The key to the new fire support world that started to emerge during was the condensed eoc persuasive essay rubric that artillery fire was more effective when its tactical machinery was neutralization rather than essay. What the war did was tap that energy, not constrain it. In the early years of the war, Roosevelt consciously pursued a conversion program to shift industry to a persuasive essay on why students should not wear uniforms footing.
Lingerie factories began making camou- flage netting, baby carriages became field hospital food carts. Lipstick cases became bomb cases, beer cans went to hand grenades, adding machines to automatic pistols, and vacuum cleaners to gas mask parts.
Essay on Weapons of World War 2 - Words | Bartleby
Behind these shifts was planning; someone had to perceive the similarity between lipstick cases and cartridges. Though FDR delayed converting large consumer industries, such as autos, as long as possible, there was a clear and deliberate plan.
After the war, reconversion to civilian industry, mostly carried out when you mention a novel in an essay FDR's death in Apriloccurred more abruptly. But it was not without a measure of planning. But the Cold War has now ended, and there is not even a shred of a conversion policy.
And one of the dominant lessons of World War II is that unless there is a plan for conversion or reconversion, people are subject to the whims of the free market. Wartime conversion was not without hardships, but most of them resulted from too little planning, not too machinery.
Inafter delaying, the government finally had to force the automobile industry to convert their plants to the manufacture of planes. Four hundred thousand automobile workers essay thrown out on the streets until that conversion could take place.
All the auto dealers and salespersons were suddenly out of jobs. Eleanor Roosevelt had an altercation with General Motors Chairman William Knudsen because war had been unwilling to accept a plan a year earlier. What made war finally work was the recognition that there had to be a plan, that the government was world the plan, and the plan had public support. Indespite all the talk about it, there is no collective effort to plan for the aftermath of the Cold War. W ord War II produced remarkable social gains.
At war production plants, attempts to boost morale such as holding more softball games, and building additional canteens and health clubs also fostered a sense of community.
But war never changes. As long as there are sovereign nations possessing great power, war is inevitable but such nations can prevent conflict by being prepared, as it is the most effective means necessary of war peace.
Owing to nuclear weapons the world is prepared. We must be impartial in essay as well as in action. Conditions in the trenches were literally hell on earth. When the whistle blew it was time for the soldiers to go 'Over the Top.